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Abstract
We show that appropriate dynamic pricing strategies can be used to draw benefits from the presence
of consumers who strategically time their purchase even if the arrival process is not known. In our model,
a seller sells a stock of objects to a stream of randomly arriving long-lived agents. Agents are privately
informed about their values, and about their arrival time to the market. The seller needs to learn about
future demand from past arrivals. We characterize the revenue maximizing direct mechanism. While
the optimal mechanism cannot be reduced to posted prices (and requires personalized prices), we also
present a simple, ”learn and then sell” mechanism that is able to extract a large fraction of the maximal
revenue. In this mechanism the seller first charges a relatively low price that allows learning about the
arrival process, and in a second stage, the seller charges the optimal posted price given the previously
obtained information
1 Introduction
Revenue Management - broadly speaking, the study of the dynamic allocation of capacity and its pricing
under uncertain, fluctuating demand - has been pioneered on an industrial scale by airline companies in the
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mid 70’s. These practices have rapidly spread to the allocation of fixed capacities in hotel booking, freight
transportation, car rentals and holiday resorts, the retail of seasonal and style goods (e.g., groceries and
apparel), electricity generation, e-business (online advertising and broadcasting, allocation of bandwidth),
and event management (sports, concerts, etc...).
The RM techniques utilized in practice yield frequent price fluctuations, as prices depend on a multitude
of constantly changing variables such as time to take-off or major event, remaining capacity, demand fore-
casts, weather and so on. In particular, prices significantly change following unexpected demand shocks, as
airlines, for example, have the time and ability to revise their estimates about residual demand (see Escobari
[2012]). As a consequence, customers have an incentive to strategize by carefully timing their purchase.
Until recently the execution of careful purchase timing strategies by consumers was encumbered by the
fact that pricing algorithms are relatively opaque, and by the absence of reliable historical data: strategizing
customers were basically playing a lottery. This dramatically changed with the advent of price comparison
websites such as Bing/Travel and Kayak who offer free advice (based on huge amounts of data and on
Artificial Intelligence algorithms) about the timing of purchase: customers for a certain flight are advised
whether to buy immediately or wait, together with an estimate of the probability of saving money by waiting
(See Etzioni [2003] for the scientific basis of this development). Similar websites offer advice about the
timing of purchase for durable goods.
The conventional wisdom is that consumer strategizing may hurt revenues (see, for example, Mantin and
Rubin [2013] who estimate a 3% revenue loss on routes where information from Bing/Travel is available,
or Soysal and Krishnamurthi [2012] who estimate a significant 11% loss in the market for fashion goods).
Li, Granados and Netessine [2014] empirically estimate the percentage of strategic customers in the airline
industry (a significant fraction is found) and carefully expose the existing trade-off between lowering prices
in the future and loosing demand by keeping prices high. Interestingly, the effect of strategic consumers is
ambiguous in their study1.
With strategic consumers revenue may be potentially harmed both by the shift in demand to lower prices,
and by the indirect effect on the seller’s ability to learn about residual demand. Since the underlying pricing
techniques observed by the empirical studies were not necessarily optimized with respect to the strategic
timing of purchases, it is important to show -as we do here -that the presence of strategic consumers can
never decrease revenue if the optimal pricing technique that accounts for their presence is used.
In this paper we study a dynamic trading model where a designer allocates several units to a stream
of randomly arriving, privately informed agents. Agents arrive according to a general Markov counting
1Strategic customers are found to have a beneficial effect in the group buying model of Marinesi, Girotra, Netessine [2016].
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process. This class is particularly important, since it includes the Poisson arrival process with unknown
arrival rate (see e.g. Presman [1990], and Example 4.2 in the present paper). In fact, almost the entire
literature deals solely with this case.
All agents are long lived, and each agent is privately informed about his value for an object, and about
his arrival time to the market (thus, private information is two-dimensional). As the designer may not be
aware of the nature of the arrival process, this naturally leads to correlation between arrival times from the
designers point of view. A major feature of our model is that the designer learns about future demand from
past arrivals (for example, an airline may learn both from past sales but also by gathering information about
“waiting” customers on platforms such as Bing/Travel). In turn, agents strategically choose when to make
themselves available for trade, and in doing so they realize that they influence the designer’s beliefs, and
hence, potentially, their own terms of trade. Both agents and designer discount the future, and the designer
wishes to maximize his expected revenue.
We first look at the benchmark case with observable arrivals: private information pertains only to values
and is one-dimensional. As in a static auction, the seller’s revenue is maximized by a policy that maximizes
the expected discounted sum of virtual values (Theorem 6).
If arrivals are unobservable, mechanisms need to take into account the second dimension of the agents
private information, namely their arrival time. The main result here (Theorem 11) is based on a monotonicity
property of the revenue maximizing allocation: agents who arrive earlier get the object earlier. We use this
to show that, as long as the arrival process is Markov, the payment scheme that maximizes revenue under
observable arrivals maximizes revenue even if arrivals are unobservable. Intuitively, early arrivals may be
detrimental for the agents since, it can make the seller more optimistic about the future arrivals and may
induce higher prices. Yet, it does not imply that the agents necessarily would like to postpone their arrivals,
since later arrivals also increase the risk of sales to other agents. The Markov property implies that, in any
incentive compatible mechanism, an agent who delays his arrival and arrives at time t gets exactly the same
expected utility as an agent with the same value who truthfully arrives at t.
Agents also solve here an optimal stopping problem: when to reveal their presence to the mechanism
designer? Because the designer’s decision is itself the solution to a sequence of optimal stopping problems,
this allows us to show that, under the above payment scheme, it is optimal for every agent to announce his
presence immediately. This characterization uses a specific and important physical property of the private
information about the arrival time: an agent may misrepresent it only in one direction, i.e., by arriving or
making himself available for trade later. Therefore, only one-directional deviations with respect to arrival
time should be taken into account.
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Board and Skrzypacz [2015] recently demonstrated the optimality of posted price mechanisms (followed
by an auction at the deadline in case of a finite horizon) for a dynamic environment with long-lived agents
that arrive according to a Poisson process with a known, fixed arrival rate. The main conclusion of the
present paper is that the need to learn about future demand renders this class of mechanisms sub-optimal:
revenue maximization in the environment with learning generally requires mechanisms where prices are
more involved than just posted prices. In particular, the price charged to an agent depends on the entire
history (including his own arrival to the market) and needs thus to be personalized.
Nevertheless, complex direct mechanisms are rarely used in practice. Therefore, we also present a very
simple, indirect two-phase mechanism that is able to extract a large fraction of the maximal revenue even if
the number of objects is not very large. In this mechanism the seller first charges a relatively low price that
allows him to learn about the arrival process. In a second stage, the seller charges the optimal fixed posted
price given the information obtained in the first stage.
Our analysis also answers the question whether the seller can increase revenue by withholding infor-
mation from potential buyers. For example, shall an airline inform buyers about the remaining number of
seats? Shall a fashion store inform buyers when only few items of the current collection are left in store to
discourage waiting for the end-of-season sale?
The effects of informing customers go in different directions. When the remaining stock is low it reduces
customers incentive to wait and thus increases the discounted per unit revenue of the seller. When the stock
is high, the opposite happens. Yin, Aviv & Pazgal [2009] find that, with a known Poisson arrival process,
two types of buyers and a seller who is restricted to two posted prices, hiding the number of remaining items
from potential buyers can increase expected revenue by up to 20%. In contrast, we show in Theorem 15
that, if the seller is not restricted to in his choice of mechanism, hiding information is never beneficial.
Finally, we use the above results to show that the presence of long-lived agents who strategize over the
timing of their purchases (assuming arrivals are unobservable) yields a higher revenue than the one optimally
obtained in the situation where agents are short lived and must buy immediately upon arrival (Corollary 16).
In other words, we show that appropriate revenue management techniques can be used to overcome and
even draw benefits from the presence of consumers who strategically choose their purchase time. This is
particularly important in environments where learning about demand is relevant since in those settings the
advantages of RM techniques over simpler “naive” strategies such as fixed pricing or pricing without belief
updates are most pronounced (see Aviv and Pazgal [2005] and Aviv, Levin and Nediak [2009] for excellent
discussions of these issues).
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1.1 Literature Review
A pioneering study or revenue management with myopic customers and known (but stochastic) demand
process is Gallego and van Ryzin [1994]2. There arriving customers buy an homogenous product if the cur-
rent price is below their willingness to pay and leave the market otherwise. Newer studies generalize some
features of the workhorse model, e.g. Gershkov and Moldovanu [2009a] analyze revenue maximization and
inventory planning with short-lived agents and with several heterogenous objects.
In practice, there are many instances where agents are long-lived and strategize over purchase time, and
where the seller observes sales and needs to make an accurate demand forecasting in a complex, changing
environment. The combination of these features are the focus of the present paper. The first attempts to
incorporate a randomly arriving stream of non-myopic, long-lived agents appeared in the search literature,
e.g., Zuckerman [1988], Zuckerman [1986], Stadje [1991], and Boshuizen and Gouweleeuw [1993]. There
the planner is perfectly informed about the arrival process, the values and arrival times. Thus, pricing does
not play a role, and the focus is on the allocation procedure. In a pricing model, Aviv and Pazgal [2008]
quantify the losses incurred by assuming that agents are myopic when, instead, they are forward-looking.
The ensuing RM literature displayed various ingenious methods to adjust the pricing techniques developed
for myopic consumers in order to take into account strategic timing of purchases. Notable examples are:
Gallego, Kou and Phillips [2008] (option on callable seats with possible reallocation), Elmaghraby et. al
[2009] (selling with future reservations), Jerath, Nettessine, Verarghavan [2009] (opaque sales through an
intermediary, so that consumers do not know which brand they get), Osdachyi and Vulcano [2010] (combina-
tion of temporal price discrimination with rationing at the low price), Su [2007] (exploitation of differences
in patience among customers’ patience), Marinesi, Girotra, Netessine [2016] (threshold discounts for group
purchasing) Chen and Farias [2015] (limits on the magnitude of price drops) and Borgs et al. [2014] (vary-
ing capacity in a finite horizon model with deterministic demand). It is fair to say that none of these papers
attempts a full mechanism design analysis where optimality is analytically established with respect to a large
class of pricing procedures.
Closer in spirit to our paper, Gallien [2006] analyzes revenue maximization in a model where the agents
are long-lived, and where arrivals are private information. He focuses on a commonly known arrival process
where sales always occur upon arrival. The resulting optimal pricing scheme is time-independent, thus
strategizing in the time dimension and the ensuing learning - which are the focus of our paper - do not play
any role3.
2As Talluri and van Ryzin [2004] note in their excellent book, this has been for many years the workhorse model
3In other words, Gallien’s solution coincides with the one where arrivals are observable, and where agents are short lived (see
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Another closely related paper is Board and Skrzypacz [2015]. They characterize revenue maximization
in a model with patient agents where arrivals are described by a Poisson process with a known, fixed arrival
rate. A main assumption is that current arrivals are independent of past ones. Therefore, learning from past
arrivals about the future demand does not play a role in their model. Roughly speaking, allocative externality
payments (modified to maximize virtual values instead of values) maximize revenue in their case. The main
structural elements of the revenue maximizing mechanism are posted prices, which is also the case in the
setting with short lived agents. In contrast, the implication of learning is that mechanisms that post prices do
not maximize revenue. Similar to our Corollary 16, Board and Skrzypacz show that, in their environment,
strategic customers increase the sellers revenue.4 5
The other main topic of our paper, the trade-offs between dynamic pricing and earning while learning
about demand, has also been emphasized in the recent RM literature. For example, Bora Keskin and Zeevi
[2014] and Besbes and Zeevi [2015] look at learning in dynamic pricing models with deterministic demand
whose parameters are not known to the seller. Closer to our paper, Mason and Va¨lima¨ki [2011] focus on
posted-price mechanisms in a model with one object and with stochastic, unobservable arrivals of short-lived
buyers. Aviv and Pazgal [2005] also consider myopic agents arriving according to a Poisson process whose
rate follows a Gamma distribution. The arrival processes in both previously mentioned papers are special
cases of the class considered here, but the strategic effects of delaying arrivals do not arise in their models
because the agents - who can only be served upon arrival - cannot manipulate the designer’s belief about the
underlying demand. Araman and Caldentey [2009] allow for patient buyers and numerically evaluate the
consequences6. Again, it is fair to say that no general mechanism design analysis was attempted yet.
A different type of dynamic model - leading to a completely different contracting environment - was
pioneered by Courty and Li [2000]: it has all agents present at all periods. but their information arrives over
time. Recent mechanism design analyses of revenue maximization in such frameworks include Kakade,
Lobel and Nazerzadeh [2013] and Pavan, Segal and Toikka [2014]. While the setup analyzed of Kakade,
Lobel and Nazerzadeh [2013] and Pavan, Segal and Toikka [2014] is quite general, it does not cover our
Albright [1977] and Gershkov and Moldovanu [2009a]).
4Board and Skrzypacz’s [2015] paper and the present article where written in parallel, and independently of each other.
5It is also instructive to compare their results to models with myopic buyers, where auctions take place at each period, e.g. as
in Vulcano, van Ryzin and Magalaras [2002]. Besbes and Lobel [2012], Pai and Vohra [2008] and Mierendorff [2010a] analyze
revenue maximization in models where arriving agents are privately informed about values, and about a deadline by which they
need the object. The distribution of the number of arrivals in each period is known to the designer and there is no learning in these
models.
6As in the paper by Mason and Valima¨ki, the arrival process is Poisson with two possible rates
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case where arrival times are private information and customers report them strategically.7 Moreover, in
those papers the designer can not learn from past demand, about future demand since private information
is independently distributed. In contrast, in our paper learning (i.e. correlation between arrivals) is a main
feature of the analysis, and extending their type of analysis to our setup seems very hard.
Finally there is a related literature that looks at efficient dynamic mechanism design, e.g. Bergemann and
Va¨lima¨ki [2010], Cavallo, Parkes and Singh [2010], Parkes and Singh [2003], Said [2012], Athey and Segal
[2013]. It is important to note, for example, that the independence assumptions in Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki
do not hold in our model since arrivals are correlated and unobservable. Moreover, the mechanisms used
by Athey and Segal are excluded here by the requirement that prices cannot depend on information arriving
after the allocation time. In a companion paper, Gershkov et. al [2014], we find that it is often impossible to
implement the welfare maximizing allocation if the process is not Markov.
2 The Model
A designer endowed with k ≥ 1 indivisible, identical objects faces a stream of randomly arriving agents in
continuous time. The probability measure over agents’ arrival times is generated by a time-inhomogeneous
Markov counting process (N (t))t≥0 where N (t) ∈ N is the random variable representing the number of
arrivals up to time t. The arrival time of the i’s agent is then given by
ai = inf{t ∈ R+ : N (t) ≥ i} .
The Markov assumption implies that the probability measure over arrivals after time t only depends on t and
on the number of agentsN (t) who arrived prior to time t, but not on when precisely they arrived. Moreover,
we assume, that there exists a bounded rate function λ : R+×N→ R+ such that the conditional probability
of m ≥ 1 agents arriving depends only on the time t, and on the number of prior arrivals:
lim
∆↘0
1
∆
P
[
N (t+ ∆) = N (t) +m | (N (s))s≤t
]
= 1{m=1}λ(t,N (t)) .
This assumption ensures that the probability that multiple agents arrive at the same time equals zero. The
time horizon is potentially infinite, but the framework is rich enough to embed the finite horizon case by
considering arrival processes where, after some time, T < ∞ no more arrivals occur, i.e., where for any n,
7 It is in principle possible to embed our model in the informational structure studied by Kakade, Lobel and Nazerzadeh [2013]
and by Pavan, Segal and Toikka [2014]: in their language, this would require each agent’s valuation to jump up from zero at a single
random point in time (arrival in our model) But, our information at time zero is two-dimensional (jump time and jump size) while
these authors require the private information at time zero to be one-dimensional.
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t ≥ T the arrival rate is zero λ(t, n) = 0 . Since arrivals are described by Markov counting processes, the
designer’s beliefs about future arrivals may evolve over time, and may also depend on the number of past
arrivals.
Each agent’s private information is two-dimensional: the arrival time ai ≥ 0 and the value vi ≥ 0 he
gets if allocated an object. In other words, we assume that the designer observes neither agents’ arrivals
nor their values. Each agent demands exactly one object. We denote by τi the (random) time the designer
allocates an object to the i-th agent and set τi =∞ if agent i does not receive an object.
If agent i arrives at time ai, gets the object at time τi ≥ ai and pays pi at time τ ′ ∈ [ai, τi], then his
discounted utility is given by
e−rτivi − e−rτ ′ipi
where r ≥ 0 is the discount factor. Note that this specification leads to the same preferences (and hence to
the same behavior) as those obtained by assuming that an agent discounts the future relative to his arrival
time, i.e.,
e−r(τi−ai)vi − e−r(τ ′i−ai)pi.
Consequently, the revenue maximizing mechanism for both specifications is the same.
The agents’ values are represented by I.I.D. random variables vi on the support [0, v¯] where v¯ ≤ ∞,
with common c.d.f. F : [0, v¯] → [0, 1] and with continuous, strictly positive density f : [0, v¯] → R+. We
assume that each vi has a finite mean µ ≥ 0, and a finite variance. We make a standard assumption that the
virtual valuation v − 1−F (v)f(v) is increasing in v. While we allow for arrival times to be correlated between
agents, we assume that valuations are independent. We also assume that, for each agent, his arrival time is
independent of his value.8
The designer maximizes his expected discounted revenue. That is, a payment of p at time τ ′ generates
utility of e−rτ ′p to the designer. Potentially, every agent may pay more than once. However, because the
agent has the same discount factor as the seller, if some agent pays more than once, there exists another
mechanism that generates the same expected discounted payment and utilities where every agent pays only
once. If we denote by τ ′i the time agent i makes a payment of pi the discounted revenue of principal is given
by
∞∑
i=1
e−rτ
′
ipi .
8Independence allows us to focus on learning from arrivals, as opposed to learning from values. Assuming dependence between
the arrival times and values generates correlation among the values. This creates distinct, additional complications, as explored in
Gershkov and Moldovanu [2009b] and Gershkov and Moldovanu [2012].
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2.1 Direct Revelation Mechanisms
We look for the revenue maximizing procedure within a very general class of mechanisms. The designer
can commit to any game played by the agents in order to determine who receives an object and at which
price. Commitment is a crucial assumption. Special cases are auctions at predetermined times and posted
price mechanisms.
The Revelation Principle for dynamic environments (see Myerson [1986]) implies that we can restrict
attention to direct mechanisms where each agent reports his value and arrival time, and where the mechanism
specifies a probability distribution over times when each agent gets an object, and a payment. Without
loss of generality, we can restrict attention to mechanisms where each agent reports his type upon arrival,
e.g., the time of the report coincides with the arrival time. This holds since the equilibrium outcome of
any mechanism where at least one agent reports his type after his arrival, can be replicated by another
mechanism and equilibrium where all agents reports their types upon arrival. Another implication of the
revelation principle to the dynamic environments is that, in the direct mechanisms, no information should
be revealed about the previous arrivals and reports. Intuitively, minimizing the information revealed to each
agent reduces the available contingent deviations from truthtelling, and relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraints for that agent. Therefore, each agent i choose a time a˜i at which to report his arrival to the
mechanism and a message to sent to the mechanism mi ∈ [0, v¯].
A direct mechanism (τ, p, τ ′) specifies the allocation times (τi(a˜i,mi))i∈N, payments (pi(a˜i,mi))i∈N
and the payment times (τ ′i(a˜i,mi))i∈N as a function of times of reports and messages sent. Since in the
optimal policy a sale can occur later than an actual arrival, the allocation and payment to an agent can also
be conditioned on information that accrues between the arrival time of that agent and the allocation time.
Denote by
h(t) = ((a˜j ,mj) : a˜j ≤ t)
the history of reports up to time t : this consists of the reported values mj and the times of the reports a˜j .
Finally, we denote by E[ · | h(t)] the probability measure conditional on the history h(t).
A vector (τi)i∈N of allocation times is feasible if no agent receives an object before he reported his
arrival, a˜i ≤ τi(a˜,m), or pays before his arrival, a˜i ≤ τ ′i(a˜,m), and if at most k objects are allocated∑∞
i=1 1{τi(a˜,m)<∞} ≤ k. Furthermore, as objects can not be reallocated τi(a˜,m) must be constant in all
a˜j ,mj such that a˜j > τi.
Assumption 1 (Individual Rationality) We restrict attention to ex-post individual rational mechanisms,
where, after every history, the equilibrium utilities of all agents are non-negative.
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Assumption 1 ensures that no agent makes a payment larger than his discounted utility from consuming
the good. This rules out selling lotteries where the agent makes an up-front payment and randomly receives
the good later. Furthermore, Assumption 1 excludes random payment schemes a la Cremer and McLean
[1988], where agents guess other agents’ reports - this could, in principle, be used to extract information
about correlated arrival times at no cost.
Since the agents and the designer have the same discount factor, we can assume without loss of generality
that the payment times coincide with allocation times: a direct mechanism (τ, p) specifies then allocation
times (τi(a˜i,mi))i∈N and payments (pi(a˜i,mi))i∈N as a function of reported arrivals and messages sent.
2.2 Incentive Compatibility
We assume that no agent can report his arrival before he truly arrives a˜i ≥ ai.9 A strategy a˜i,mi for agent i
is a mapping from his private type (a, vi) into a stopping/reporting time a˜i and a value mi. Denote by Ei,t[·]
agent i’s expectations conditional on his private information (ai, vi), and assume that all other agent’s report
their arrival immediately, a˜j = aj , and report their values truthfully, mj = vj .
Bayesian incentive compatibility requires that it is optimal for every agent to report his arrival immedi-
ately, and also to report truthfully his value. That is, for any i, it holds:
(ai, vi) ∈ arg max
a˜i≥ai,mi
Ei
[
e−rτ
′
i(a˜,m)vi − e−rτ ′i(a˜,m)pi(a˜,m)
]
.
3 Observable Arrivals
In this section we analyze the designer’s problem under the simplifying assumption that he observes all
arrivals. Thus, the agents’ private information only pertains to values. However, we still assume that agents
do not observe the arrivals and reports of previously arrived agents. Our first result shows that, although
hiding information from buyers can facilitate the implementation of certain allocations, it does not affect the
expected revenue from allocations that are implementable via other information structures. That is, if some
allocation is incentive compatible even if some information is revealed, then it generates the same expected
revenue as the mechanism that implements the same allocation and reveals no information10.
9Although the so called “revelation principle” need not hold in settings where some deviations from truth-telling are unfeasible
for certain types, this principle does hold for our case of unilateral deviations in the time dimension - see Theorem 1 and Example
5.a.2 in Green and Laffont [1986].
10While our original definition of incentive compatibility corresponds to the environment where every agent only knows his
arrival time and value, the definition straightforwardly extends to the present environment: it requires that, for any observed signal
about the past history, it is optimal for every agent to report his arrival immediately and his value truthfully.
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Theorem 1 (Generalized Revenue Equivalence) Suppose that arrivals are observable to the principal,
and that, at the time of his arrival ai, each agent i observes his valuation vi and a signal si which is (weakly)
less informative than observing the entire prior history of arrivals and reported values {(a˜j)j≤N (ai), (mj)j≤N (ai),j 6=i}.11
Furthermore, assume that this signal is also observable to the principal. Than, the expected revenue of the
principal in an incentive compatible mechanism that implements the allocation τ = (τi)i∈N such that every
agent with a valuation of zero gets a utility of zero equals
E
[∑
i∈N
e−rτi(a,v,s)J(vi)
]
where J(vi) := vi − 1−F (vi)f(vi) .
Proof. As the signal si is observable to the principal, he can potentially condition the allocation τi and the
payment P on it. To reflect this dependence in our notation we write τi(v, a, s). By the Envelope Theorem,
the expected payoff of agent i in any incentive compatible mechanism when arriving at time ai with a value
of vi and a signal si is given by
E
[∫ vi
0
e−rτi(a,(z,v−i),s)dz | si, vi, ai
]
= E
[∫ vi
0
e−rτi(a,(z,v−i),s)dz | si, ai
]
,
where the above equality follows as future arrivals and valuations are independent of all past valuations by
assumption. It follows from the law of iterated expectations that the ex-ante (i.e., before seeing his signal
and arrival time) expected payoff (or information rent) to agent i is given by
E
[
E
[∫ vi
0
e−rτi(a,(z,v−i),s)dz | si, ai
]]
= E
[∫ vi
0
e−rτi(a,(z,v−i),s)dz
]
.
The outer expectation on the left-hand side is over the signals and arrival times the agent could observe,
while the inner expectation is over arrival times and valuations of all agents. The expectation on the right-
hand side is over valuations, arrivals and signals of all agents, and for the rest of the proof we shall only
use this expectation. The expected utility agent i assigns to the mechanism before knowing his arrival time,
11In particular, this implies that the signal is independent of vi, the valuation of player i, vi. Moreover, we assume that the signal
si also contains information on i′s own arrival ai.
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valuation or signal is thus given by
E
[∫ vi
0
e−rτi(a,(z,v−i),s)dz
]
=
∫ v
0
E
[∫ x
0
e−rτi(a,(z,v−i),s)dz
]
f(x)dx
= E
[∫ v
0
f(x)
∫ x
0
e−rτi(a,(z,v−i),s)dz dx
]
= E
[∫ v
0
(1− F (x))e−rτi(a,(x,v−i),s)dx
]
= E
[
1− F (vi)
f(vi)
e−rτi(a,v,s)
]
.
At the last step we used integration by parts. Subtracting the expected value of the agents from the total
surplus generated by the mechanism
∑
i e
−rτi(a,v,s)vi, we obtain that the expected revenue in any incentive
compatible mechanism equals
E
[∑
i
e−rτi(a,v,s)
(
vi − 1− F (vi)
f(vi)
)]
.
Define Wk(t) as the highest expected discounted sum of virtual values J(vi) the designer can achieve
by optimally choosing allocation times (τ1, τ2, . . . , ) and such that, after time t. it allocate at most k objects
to the agents who did not receive an object prior to time t :
Wk(h(t)) = sup
τ, τi≥t
E
[∑
i
e−r(τi−t)J(vi) | h(t)
]
.
As the arrival rate function λ(n, t) is uniformly bounded by a constant λ¯ < ∞ , and as the designer can
always ignore arrivals, an upper bound is what the designer can achieve when the arrival rate is constant
and equal to λ¯. In this case, the revenue of the designer and hence Wk is bounded by the revenue which is
generated if the designer has infinitely many objects and if he gives each agent an object at a price equal to
that agent’s value
Wk(h(t)) ≤ E
[∑
i
e−r aivi
]
= E[vi]
∞∑
i=1
(
λ
λ+ r
)i
=
λµ
r
.
As Wk(h(t)) is bounded from above, it is well defined for all k, h(t). Note that Wk constitutes an upper
bound on the revenue that is achievable in any incentive compatible mechanism with k objects to allocate.
Let κ(t) be the number of remaining objects the designer can allocate κ(t) := k −∑i 1{τi<t}. We
define the policy τ which allocates an object to agent i at the earliest time at which it is optimal to do so12
τi = inf{t : J(vi) ≥Wκ(t)(h(t))−Wκ(t)−1(h(t)) and κ(t) ≥ 1} .
12If there are two agents for whom an allocation is optimal at the same time, the one with the higher value gets allocated the
object first. We follow the convention that inf ∅ =∞.
12
By definition, τ is a stopping time and it allocates at most k objects. Hence, τ is a feasible allocation time
that maximizes the expected discounted sum of virtual valuations:
τ ∈ arg max
τ∈T
E
[∑
i∈N
e−rτiJ(vi)
]
.
As τ depends only on the realized sequence of arrival times a = (a1, a2, . . .) and valuations v = (v1, v2, . . .)
we use the notation τ(a, v).
From the previous Theorem, it follows that if policy τ is implementable (that is, if there exists a payment
scheme p, such that the mechanism (τ, p) is incentive compatible) when arrivals are observable, then
this mechanism is optimal. Similarly to static revenue equivalence, this result emphasizes the underlining
allocation rule, while the pricing scheme plays only a secondary role. It also illustrates that the revealed
information is of secondary importance as long as the underlying allocation is implementable. In other
words, unless the allocation changes, the seller cannot increase his expected utility by hiding/ misreporting
his private information.
We first characterize the implementable allocation rules if all the information regarding the reports of
the previous agents is revealed. We then show that τ(a, v) is implementable. Similarly to the static en-
vironment, implementability hinges on a notion of monotonicity: for any history h(ai) preceding a given,
reported arrival of agent i, increasing the reported valuation vi decreases the expected discounted time for
obtaining an object E[e−rτi | h(ai)]. Based on this observation, our main result in this Section shows that
the allocation τ(a, v) is indeed revenue maximizing. In addition to implementing τ(a, v), the associated
payment scheme generates zero utility to an agent with zero valuation.
Definition 2 Consider two histories h(ai) and h′ (ai) that differ only in the valuation of agent i, such that
v′i, the valuation of i in h
′ (ai), is larger than vi, the valuation in h (ai) . An allocation rule τ is monotone
with respect to valuations if for any agent i, and for any two such histories it holds that
E
[
e−rτi(a,(v
′
i,v−i)) |h′(ai)
]
≥ E
[
e−rτi(a,(vi,v−i)) |h(ai)
]
.
Theorem 3 (Monotone Allocations are Implementable) Assume that all the information regarding the re-
ports of the agents is revealed. Assume further that arrivals are observable. If the allocation τ is imple-
mentable, then it is monotone with respect to valuations. Conversely, if the allocation τ is monotone with
respect to valuations, then τ can be implemented using a payment paid at the time of allocation τi:
Pi(a, v) = 1{τi(a,v)<∞}
E
[∫ vi
0
(
e−rτi(a,v) − e−rτi(a,(z,v−i))) dz |h(ai)]
E
[
e−rτi(a,v) |h(ai)
] . (1)
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Although the time when agent i gets the object depends on the history up to this time (in particular, it
depends on the arrival times and values of the agents that arrive after the arrival of i), his payment only
depends only on the information available up to his arrival.
Therefore, to show that the allocation rule τ(a, v) is implementable, we have to show that it is mono-
tone with respect to valuations. Instead of directly showing the monotonicity of τ(a, v), we will use the
monotonicity of another, closely related allocation rule, and the assumption that the virtual value function
J(v) is increasing in v. Denote by τ? ∈ T the welfare maximizing policy under complete information
τ? ∈ arg max
τ∈T
E
∑
j∈N
e−rτjvj
 .
By the same argument which we gave for virtual valuations, the realized optimal allocation depends only
on the realized sequence of arrival times a = (a1, a2, . . .) and of valuations v = (v1, v2, . . .) and we use the
notation τ?(a, v).
The next Proposition shows that a payment equal to the expected allocative externality (conditional
on the information available to the agent at arrival), divided by the expected discounted allocation time
implements the efficient (welfare maximizing) allocation.Despite the possible correlation in arrival times.
which implicitly determine whether the value for the object at a certain period is positive or not in the
formulation of Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [2010], their dynamic pivot mechanism implements the efficient
allocation in the case of observable arrivals since, conditional on the observable arrivals, the agents’ values
are independent.
Proposition 4 (Pivotal Payment) The payment scheme
Pi(a, v) = 1{τi(a,v)<∞}
E
[∑
j 6=i(e
−rτ?j (a,(0,v−i)) − e−rτ?j (a,v))vj |h(ai)
]
E
[
e−rτ?i (a,v) |h(ai)
] (2)
implements the efficient dynamic allocation policy τ∗. The resulting mechanism is ex-post individually
rational.
Corollary 5 (Monotonicity in Valuations) The stopping time that maximizes the expected discounted sum
of virtual valuations τ is monotone in valuations.
Finally, we now have all the necessary tools in order to prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 6 (Revenue Maximizing Policy) When arrivals are observable, the policy τ is implementable
using the following payments, which are charged upon allocation:
Pi(a, v) = 1{τi (a,v)<∞}
E
[∫ vi
0
(
e−rτi (a,v) − e−rτi (a,(z,v−i))) dz |h(ai)]
E
[
e−rτi (a,v) |h(ai)
] . (3)
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Consequently, this mechanism is revenue maximizing.
Proof. By Corollary 5, the policy τ is monotone with respect to valuations, and thus implementable by
Theorem 3. By the definition of τ as the virtual valuation maximizing allocation, and by Theorem 1, the
revenue in any other implementable mechanism is lower than the revenue in this mechanism.
4 Unobservable Arrivals
4.1 The Revenue Maximizing Direct Mechanism
Is the revenue-maximizing allocation derived in Theorem 6 implementable also in case where arrivals are
unobservable? Proving that truthful reporting of arrival times is incentive compatible under the payment
scheme of Theorem 6 is difficult because no explicit solution τ to the designer’s allocation problem when he
observes valuations and arrivals is known. Hence, it is not possible to directly verify that, under the proposed
optimal stopping time τ, agents have incentives to truthfully report their arrival times. We overcome this
difficulty by connecting the incentives of an agent to report a later arrival with the designer’s incentives to
delay the allocation of the object. Note that in the direct mechanism an agent who decides when to report
his arrival also solves an optimal stopping problem about his arrival time!
Definition 7 (Monotonicity in Arrivals) A vector of deterministic allocation times (τ1, τ2, . . .) is mono-
tone in arrival times if and only if agents who arrive earlier get the object earlier, i.e. for all i, ai < a˜i and
all a−i, v ∈ R∞+
τi((ai, a−i), v) ≤ τi((a˜i, a−i), v) .
We will show that monotonicity in arrivals is sufficient to ensure that incentive compatibility of a mech-
anism with observable arrivals will imply incentive compatibility of the same mechanism with unobservable
arrivals. We first characterize the agents’ utilities in all mechanisms that are incentive compatible with
observable arrivals.
Proposition 8 Assume that the payment P implements τ under observable arrivals. The utility of agent i
equals
Ui(h(ai)) = E
[∫ v
0
e−r τi(a,(z,v−i))dz |h(ai)
]
+ Ui((a1, . . . , ai), (v1, . . . , vi−1, 0)) .
Lemma 9 Fix an arbitrary mechanism (τ,P). An agent i who misreports his arrival a˜i > ai obtains the
same expected utility as if he would have arrived at time a˜i and used the same strategy to report his value.
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An immediate consequence of Lemma 9 is that if agent i misreports his arrival it is still optimal for him
to truthfully report his value vi.
Corollary 10 Assume that the payment P implements τ under observable arrivals. It is optimal for every
agent i to report his value vi truthfully even when he misreports his arrival.
The next theorem uses the previous results to show that if a mechanism is incentive compatible with
observable arrivals it is also incentive compatible with unobservable arrivals as long as 1) agents who do
value the object at zero obtains an equilibrium utility of 0; and 2) agents who arrive earlier receive the object
earlier.
Theorem 11 Consider a vector of allocation times (τ1, τ2, . . .) and a vector of payments P such that:
1 the payment P implements τ under observable arrivals
2 τ is monotone in arrival times
3 (τ,P) yields zero utility for every agent with zero value.
Then P implements τ under unobservable arrivals.
Proof. By Corollary 10 the agent will report his value truthfully in any mechanism that is incentive
compatible under observable arrivals. Hence, we restrict attention to misreports of arrival times. Let us
denote by h˜ = ((a˜i, a−i), v) the history of the game where agent i arrives at time a˜i. By (3) the designer
does not make any transfer to the lowest type, and thus - by Proposition 8 - the utility of agent i if she arrives
at time a˜i equals
Ui(h˜(a˜i)) = E
[∫ v
0
e−r τi((a˜i,a−i),(z,v−i))dz | h˜(a˜i)
]
.
By Lemma 9 the equilibrium utility of agent i who arrived at time a˜i equals the equilibrium utility of an
agent who arrived at time ai, but misreported his arrival time to be a˜i. Hence, the expected utility of agent i
when reporting her arrival to be a˜i is given by
E
[
Ui(h˜(a˜i)) |h(ai)
]
= E
[
E
[∫ vi
0
e−rτi((a˜i,a−i),(z,v−i))dz | h˜(a˜i)
]
|h(ai)
]
= E
[
E
[∫ vi
0
e−rτi((a˜i,a−i),(z,v−i))dz | h(a˜i)
]
|h(ai)
]
= E
[∫ vi
0
e−rτi((a˜i,a−i),(z,v−i))dz | h(ai)
]
. (4)
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The first step follows since, by the Markov property, the probability measure only depends on the number of
arrivals prior to time a˜i , which is the same in the history h˜(a˜i) and h(a˜i). The last step is the law of iterated
expectations.
As τi((a˜i, a−i, (z, v−i)) increases in a˜i by assumption (2) the utility of agent i given in (4) decreases in
the reported arrival time a˜i. As agent i can not report his arrival before he arrives, i.e. a˜i ≥ ai it follows that
it is optimal to report the arrival immediately, i.e. a˜i = ai.
Theorem 11 can be now used to directly prove that the revenue maximizing allocation τ is imple-
mentable even if arrivals are unobservable.
Theorem 12 The payment defined in Theorem 6 implements policy τ under unobservable arrivals, and
this mechanism is revenue maximizing.
Proof. The payments defined in Theorem 3 for allocation policy τ leave an agent with a valuation of zero
with utility of zero. Thus, it only remains to prove that the optimal policy is monotone with respect to
arrivals. Recall that the probability measure over future arrivals depends only on the number of past arrivals.
Hence, when agent i arrives later at time a˜i > ai, the principal uses the same continuation strategy as he
would have used conditional on not allocating the object to agent i in [ai, a˜i), i.e. τi (a, v) ≥ a˜i implies that
τi ((ai, a−i) , v) = τ

i ((a˜i, a−i) , v). Consequently we have that,
τi (a, v) ≤ max {a˜i, τi (a, v)} = max {a˜i, τi ((a˜i, a−i) , v)} = τi ((a˜i, a−i) , v)
where the last step follows since no agent can get an object before arriving.
The agent can manipulate the designer’s beliefs about the latter’s continuation value only in a very
specific way: as soon as the agent reports his arrival, the designer knows his own true continuation value
since this only depends on the information that the agent arrived, but not on the precise arrival time. The
agent can still manipulate the price by changing the reported arrival time. For example, the designer’s
continuation value may be decreasing over time if no agent arrives. Thus, an agent who announces his
presence later will pay a lower price (conditional on no other agent arriving in between). But, delaying
arrival also entails the risk of another agent with a higher valuation arriving beforehand. Roughly speaking,
our above result shows that the risk of not getting the object offsets the benefits of lower future prices.
In the static case, the expected utility in any incentive compatible mechanism is specified by the alloca-
tion (up to a constant) while prices are set, for a given allocation, by the incentive compatibility constraints.
In the dynamic setting, the discounted stopping times replace the static probabilities of getting the object.
Therefore, monotonicity of the allocation with respect to values yields monotonicity of the expected utility,
17
while prices are determined by incentive compatibility with respect to values. The agent who reports type
(a′, v) where v is his true value, gets the utility of type (a′, v) independently of his true arrival time a ≤ a′
(up to the effect of discounting), since, in both cases, the designer will have the same beliefs about the
arrivals posterior to time a′. Monotonicity of the allocation with respect to arrivals together with incentive
compatibility with respect to values imply that a later arrival necessarily decreases the expected utility. In
addition, discounting makes such a deviation even less profitable.
Finally note that, in our revenue maximizing mechanism, the payment Pi made by agent i only depends
on information accruing before the time he gets allocated an object, τi. In particular, our mechanism au-
tomatically satisfies the exit condition made in Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [2010] whose consequence here
would be that agents must leave the mechanism as soon as they obtain an object
4.2 Example: Learning about the Arrival Rate of a Poisson Process
Let (N (t))t∈R+ be a Poisson process with unknown arrival rate κ ∈ {l, h} ⊂ R+. Define the posterior
arrival rate process
λ(t) = E[κ |h(t)] ,
and note that the posterior expected arrival rate λ(t) only depends on the time t and on the number of arrivals
before t, N (t), i.e. λ(t) = λ(t,N (t)). More precisely, by Bayes rule, we have that
λ(t, n) = l + (h− l)P[κ = h | Nt = n]
= l + (h− l) P[κ = h]P[Nt = n |λ = h]
P[κ = h]P[Nt = n |κ = h] + P[κ = l]P[Nt = n |κ = l]
= l +
λ(0)−l
h−l exp(−h t) (h t)
n
n! (h− l)
λ(0)−l
h−l exp(−h t) (h t)
n
n! +
h−λ(0)
h−l exp(−l t) (l t)
n
n!
= l +
h− l
1 + h−λ(0)λ(0)−l exp((h− l)t− n log(hl ))
.
We can easily introduce a deadline T¯ ∈ R+ after which the designer cannot allocate the good: this is
done by simply setting λ(t, n) = 0 for all t ≥ T¯ and all n ∈ N. As no agent arrives after time T¯ , and as the
designer discounts the future, it will never be optimal to allocate an object after the deadline.
The expected posterior arrival rate continuously decreases if there is no arrival, and it jumps up at the
time of each arrival. As a consequence, the optimal allocation policy with learning is very different from
the optimal policy without learning. To see this, consider, for example, the case of a single object. Without
learning the optimal policy is given by a constant cutoff (i.e., only types with values above a constant get
the object), together with a fire-sale auction at the deadline (if any) – see Board and Skrypacz [2015]. In our
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Figure 1: Numerical solution of the revenue maximizing cutoffs as a function of time for valuations uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. Depicted here are the cutoffs for zero to five arrivals in the single object case (red) and the the two object case (blue). The
prior assigns probability only to the arrival rates 2 and 10. The initial expected arrival rate equals 4. Higher cutoffs correspond to
more arrivals. The deadline equals T¯ = 1 and the exponential discount rate is given by r = 0.095. At the deadline T¯ there is an
auction with reserve price equal to 0.5 and the agent, who arrived with the highest valuation above 0.5 gets the object.
case with learning, the value obtained per object by a fixed continuation strategy is higher when the arrival
rate is higher, and thus the optimal policy allocates the object to agents with higher values if the arrival rate
is higher. Thus, as only higher types acquire the object, both the optimal allocation cut-off and price jump
up after every arrival (for an illustration see Figure 1). In addition, when there are several objects for sale,
both cutoffs and prices jump after each sale since supply becomes smaller.
Ignoring the opportunity of learning may cause a significant loss in revenue: For example in the setup
of Figure 1 setting the optimal allocation constant cut-off of 0.854 (i.e., optimal for the time zero expected
arrival rate of 4) yields an expected revenue of 0.577. This represents a loss of approximately 19% compared
to the optimal policy that generates here a revenue of 0.711.
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4.3 Changing Distribution of Values
We now extend our main result to a setting where the agents’ distribution of values is allowed to change over
time13. Here, the values of agents arriving at time t are represented by I.I.D. random variables vti on the
support [0, v¯t] where v¯t ≤ ∞, with common c.d.f. Ft : [0, v¯t]→ [0, 1] and with continuous, strictly positive
density ft : [0, v¯t]→ R+.14
Assumption 2 The distributions Ft are ordered by the hazard rate order, i.e., if t1 ≤ t2 then
ft1(v)
1− Ft1(v)
≥ ft2(v)
1− Ft2(v)
for all v.
The hazard rate order is a widely used stochastic order that is stronger than first order stochastic dom-
inance. Intuitively, the assumption says that later arrivals are likely to have higher values. This scenario
seems to fit well, for example, the market for airline seats where business travelers tend to arrive nearer to
the deadline.
Proposition 13 Assume that Assumption 2 holds. Denote by τ̂(a, v) the policy maximizing the expected
discounted sum of virtual valuations for a given vector of arrivals and values (a, v):
τ̂(a, v) ∈ arg max
τ∈T
E
[∑
i∈N
e−rτi
(
vi − 1− Fai(vi)
fai(vi)
)]
.
Then this policy is implementable, and the mechanism that implements it such that the agent with zero value
gets an expected utility of zero is revenue maximizing.
Compared to the scenario where the distribution of values if fixed over time, agents who arrive later
obtain an object later and there are now even less incentives to deviate in the arrival time dimension. In the
opposite scenario where hazard rates are increasing over time, the virtual value would increase over time
and the virtual value maximizing allocation could be increasing in allocation time. Thus, τ need not remain
implementable under unobservable arrivals.
4.4 The Non-Markov Case
We conclude this Section by illustrating, via an example, that the Markov assumption is crucial for our
result; in its absence, the optimal mechanism with unobservable arrivals may generate strictly less revenue
vis-a-vis the case with observable arrivals.
13We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension.
14As above, we assume that each vti has a finite mean and a finite variance, and we continue to make the standard assumption
that the virtual valuations functions v − 1−Ft(v)
ft(v)
are increasing in v for each t.
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Assume that there is one object, and that the times between two consecutive arrivals (inter-arrival times)
are I.I.D. The designer believes that all inter-arrival times distribute either uniformly on the interval [a, b] =
[1, 2], or uniformly on the interval [a, b] = [2, 3], and assigns equal probabilities to each possibility. In both
cases the distribution of the agents’ values is taken to be uniform on the interval [0, 1] .
If the designer knows the inter-arrival distribution and if he observes arrivals, the optimal mechanism is
given by a fixed posted price p[a,b] that is the unique solution to
2p∫ 1
p (v − p)dv
=
φ[a,b](r)
1− φ[a,b](r)
(5)
Here φ[a,b](r) is Laplace transform of the uniform inter-arrival distribution on support [a, b] (see Zuckerman
[1986]). Since the uniform distribution on [2, 3] first-order stochastically dominates the uniform distribution
on [1, 2],we obtain φ[1,2](r) > φ[2,3](r). Since the left hand side of equation (5) increases in p, we also
obtain p[1,2] > p[2,3].
If the designer does not know the arrival process but observes arrivals, he can replicate the same allo-
cation as above with the same posted prices. That is, the designer sets a posted price of p[1,2] for the time
interval [0, 2]. If at least one agent arrives by time t = 2, but the object was not sold, the price remains p[1,2]
until it is sold out. If no agent arrives until t = 2, the posted price drops to p[2,3], and remains fixed until it
is sold at that price.15 Note that, in this case, the payoff to the lowest type is zero.
Assume now that the designer knows neither the arrival process, nor does he observes arrivals. To show
that the designer cannot extract information about arrivals without paying something for it, we need to show
that there is no mechanism that implements the same allocation as above, such that the payoff to the lowest
type is also zero. Assume by contradiction that such a mechanism exists. Then, the charged prices must be
the same, as otherwise some agents would misreport their valuations. Consider then an agent who arrives
before time t = 2 and has value v ∈ (p[2,3], p[1,2]). If he truthfully reports his type, he obtains utility of
zero. But, if he delays his report by one unit of time, he obtains the object with probability 1 (since no one
can arrive in the meantime) and pays a price below his value. In other words, such a deviation is profitable.
Hence, if arrivals are unobservable, the designer must pay a fee to early arrivals, or he needs to distort
the allocation away from the one that was optimal under observable arrivals. In both cases, revenue must
decrease .
15In this simple example the time of the first arrival completely reveals the underlying arrival process.
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5 Extensions
5.1 The Name Your Price Mechanism
In the optimal direct mechanisms agents report their values: this feature makes such mechanisms less suit-
able for practical purposes. Nevertheless, the main distinctive feature of the optimal mechanism - the recall
option - is employed in practice. A leading example is the ”Name Your Own Price (NYOP)” mechanism and
its variants used by many firms following Priceline.com’s lead. NYOP was introduced in 2000, and today
Priceline.com generates annual revenues of 6.8 billion US$ and employs 9000 people16. In this schemes the
customer names a price upon arrival. If the price is above a posted price the buyer gets the object immedi-
ately; if it is below the seller decides whether to come back to this customer (after a period of time) and sell
at the named price. In this sense, the Name Your-Own-Price mechanism is an extension of a posted price
mechanism which allows to sell to low value customers later.17
Since the price paid by every buyer in our direct mechanism depends only on the information obtained
before the declared arrival time of that buyer (and is thus known to the buyer at the reporting time), it is
possible to implement our optimal scheme in an indirect mechanism that has some common features with
the NYOP: each agent submits a bid upon arrival, and, at each point in time, the seller decides which of the
submitted bids, if any, to satisfy. This indirect mechanism has an equilibrium where every agent submits a
bid equal to the optimal expected discounted payment conditional on getting the object, i.e., the payment
given by (3). Given these bids, the seller deduce the buyers’ values, and then uses the same allocation rule
(for the deduced values) as in the direct mechanism.
Definition 14 (Name Your Own Price Mechanism) Every agent decides on a bid and on the time of sub-
mitting his bid. At every point in time, the seller decides which of the previously submitted bids to accept (if
any). As the function Pi defined in Eq. (3) is increasing in v we can define the function vˆ(b) implicitly and
recursively in i for every sequence of reported submission times aˆ by
vˆi(b, aˆ) = min
vi
{bi = Pi(aˆ, (vi, vˆ−i(b))} ,
16Later similar schemes were adopted by additional companies in other industries (e.g., Chiching.com offers using Name Your
Price for local services). In 2005 EBay introduced a design option called ”Best Offer” that allows potential buyers to submit an
offer to a seller that can accept or reject. ScoreBig offers Name Your Own Ticket Price for sport events and concerts.
17Priceline accepts bids within a prespecified, bounded time period. The maximal time after which
priceline accepts a bid is 1 hour for national flights and 24 hours for international flights (see
http://www.priceline.com/InformationCenter/html/faq.htm#quest8).
22
where we take the minimum over the empty set to be zero. Using those inferred valuations, the seller uses
the allocation rule τ(aˆ, vˆ(b, aˆ)), where aˆ are the submission times18.
Recall that Pi(aˆ, (vi, vˆ−i(b)) depends only on the information up until aˆ. Therefore, the recursion is
with respect to i. The dynamic bidding mechanism with the allocation rule τ(aˆ, vˆ(b)) generates the same
expected revenue as the optimal mechanism.
The main difference between the above proposed mechanism and the one used by Priceline.com is the
period during which the bids are responded by the seller. The one used by Priceline.com uses an a-priori
bounded time limit for the seller to respond to the buyers’ bids.
While a NYOP mechanism is practical, it is unrealistic to expect that it can replicate the outcome of
the optimal direct mechanism. The reason is that both seller and buyers are subjected there to a heavy
computational burden: the buyers need to aggregate complex information into bids, and the seller needs to
make complex inferences (inverting bids into values) from the history of arrivals and the ex-ante information.
In the next subsection we present a much simpler mechanism that is asymptotically optimal.
5.2 A Simple, Asymptotically Optimal Mechanism
In this section we offer a very simple mechanism such that the seller observes only executed sales, and that
is often able to achieve a substantial fraction of the optimal revenue. This mechanism consists of two phases:
a learning phase of length T > 0 and a subsequent selling phase. In the learning phase, the seller sets a
relatively low price for the objects: this allows him to accumulate information regarding the agents’ arrival
process. Given the information acquired during the learning phase, the seller chooses a constant, posted
price mechanism at the second (selling) phase.
Let us illustrate the workings of this scheme in a simple example. Assume that the arrival process is
Poisson, either with a higher rate h, or with a low rate l < h. Each of the two rates has the same probability
of occurring. The seller is facing several trade-offs: 1. Setting a lower price at the learning stage enhances
the learning since more arrivals are identified, but decreases the expected revenues from these sales. 2.
Extending the learning phase improves the precision of the seller’s information regarding the arrival process,
but leaves less units to be sold at potentially higher prices during the second phase.
We analyze the mechanism backwards: we first analyze the second, selling phase; after deriving the
optimal posted price at the second phase, we analyze the learning phase. For the sake of simplicity of
illustration, we assume here that the agents values distribute uniformly on the [0, 1] interval.
18Note, that this allocation rule depends only on the times the players made bids and the bids they submitted.
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5.2.1 The Selling Phase
If arrivals are governed by a Poisson process with known rate, the optimal mechanism with short lived agents
consists of a posted price that depends on the remaining number of objects. Assume that the seller chooses
either the optimal posted price schedule given a high arrival rate, or the optimal posted price schedule given
the low rate.
Denote by yj the minimal value (or cutoff ) of a buyer who gets an object if there are j objects left.
For a Poisson arrival process with rate λ and discount rate r, the revenue for any vector of cutoffs y =
(y1, y2, . . . yn) can be recursively calculated:
Rj(y, λ) =
(yj +Rj−1(y, λ))(1− yj)
r
λ + (1− yj)
.
where j is the number of the remaining objects. The revenue maximizing cutoffs are, again recursively,
given by
yj − 1− F (yj)
f (yj)
+
λ
r
[1− F (yj−1)]2
f (yj−1)
=
λ
r
[1− F (yj)]2
f (yj)
.
Both above results follow from Gershkov and Moldovanu, 2015 (Chapter 3.4). While these authors consid-
ered only short-lived agents, it follows from the assumption of an infinite horizon that the optimal prices are
an increasing function of the remaining number of objects, and hence increase over time. Thus, when those
prices are used, it is optimal for even long lived agents to only buy upon arrival. Consequently, the optimal
policy for long-lived agents is identical to the optimal policy with short lived agents, as derived in Gershkov
and Moldovanu, 2015.
The expected revenue from j objects is then given by
Rj =
λ
r
[1− F (yj)]2
f (yj)
.
For a uniform distribution of values we obtain:
yj = 1 +
r
λ
− r
λ
√
1 +
λ
r
(
1 +
λ
r
(1− yj−1)2
)
.
Rj =
r
λ
(
2 +
λ
r
(
1 +
λ
r
(1− yj−1)2
)
− 2
√
1 +
λ
r
(
1 +
λ
r
(1− yj−1)2
))
5.2.2 The Learning Phase
With the above expressions at hand we can now analyze the first phase of the mechanism: the seller sets a
constant price equal to the lowest possible posted price in the selling phase. There are two complementary
reasons for this conclusion:
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1. The low price does not create incentives for arriving buyers to wait for the price to decrease, guaran-
teeing that it is optimal to buy upon arrival, independent of other buyers behavior19;
2. The lower price enhance learning, since it induces a larger set of buyers to make a purchase, and hence
to reveal their arrival.
After selling k objects in a learning phase of length T at a price y, the posterior probability of the high
arrival rate equals [
1 + (l/h)ke(h−l)(1−y)T
]−1
.
In the selling phase the seller uses the optimal prices for the high (low) arrival rate if the above posterior
probability is above (below) a threshold that depends on the number of remaining objects. The optimal
threshold is such that the seller is indifferent between using the high cutoff yh or the low cutoff yl, and it is
given by the ratio of losses from choosing the wrong cutoff:
[Rk(yl, l)−Rk(yh, l)]
[Rk(yh, h)−Rk(yl, h)] + [Rk(yl, l)−Rk(yh, l)] .
As a consequence, it is optimal for the seller to choose the high price in the selling phase if and only if the
number of sold objects k satisfies
Rk(yl, l)−Rk(yh, l)
Rk(yh, h)−Rk(yl, h) ≤
(
h
l
)k
e−(h−l)(1−y)T .
Table 5.2.2 and Figure 5.2.2 shows a calculated example with two possible arrival rates, 1 and 20. The
first column (x-Axes) presents the number of total available objects. The second column (light blue line) is
a benchmark that shows the fraction of the obtained revenue in a mechanism without any learning as a share
of the revenue in the scenario where the seller knows the arrival rate and sets posted prices optimally. The
revenue without learning is calculated assuming that the seller is choosing the best among the posted prices
- the one that corresponds to either a rate of 1 or a rate of 20. The third column (dark blue line) shows the
fraction of the total revenue obtained under the optimal learning phase as a share of the revenue from the
scenario with a known arrival rate. The fourth and last column (red line) shows the optimal length of the
learning phase.
Note that the revenue of the fully optimal mechanism must be between the one achieved in the opti-
mal two-phase mechanism, and the one in an environment with a known arrival rate. With more than 5
objects, the optimal two-phase mechanism is able to get at least 98% of the revenue from the hypothetical
19Formally, the equilibrium solution concept here is in dominant strategies.
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n No Experimentation Experimentation Length
5 0.950683 0.975354 0.735997
10 0.933874 0.985022 2.10662
15 0.920898 0.988287 2.75851
20 0.910127 0.989637 4.03345
25 0.900868 0.989386 4.17518
30 0.892741 0.988813 4.23548
35 0.885515 0.988151 4.26613
40 0.879031 0.987485 4.28286
45 0.877597 0.986845 4.29262
50 0.881384 0.986244 4.29865
55 0.88521 0.985682 4.30253
60 0.889024 0.984474 3.15505
65 0.892789 0.984174 3.16854
70 0.896482 0.983903 3.18082
75 0.900087 0.983657 3.19204
80 0.903591 0.983433 3.2023
85 0.906989 0.983229 3.21167
90 0.910275 0.983041 3.22022
95 0.913448 0.982868 3.22802
100 0.916508 0.982708 3.23512
Table 1: The ratio of the revenue the planer could obtain when knowing the arrival rate and the revenue he
obtains by using posted prices (column 2) or the simple mechanism introduced in Section (column 3). The
fourth column shows the optimal length of the experimentation phase the first column shows the number of
objects.
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environment (and hence from the optimal mechanism). It performs substantially better than the posted price
mechanism without a learning phase.
Finally, note that our two-phase mechanism is asymptotically efficient for the case where the number of
objects goes to infinity. To see this, observe that, if the number of the objects goes to infinity, the posted
price mechanism that charges each agent the fixed, static monopoly price is asymptotically optimal.
5.3 The Role of Information Disclosure
The seller can use various information disclosure policies, e.g. about the available stock of objects, or about
the previous arrivals. Yin et al [2009] showed that hiding information about the remaining stock is revenue
enhancing, as it places “more pressure” on the agents with high values. But we often observe disclosure of
information about the number of remaining objects, or about the timing of earlier reservations (for example,
Expedia reveals information about the number of the remaining seats in the current price category, and about
the time of the last booking in suggested hotels). Given that this information disclosure is voluntary, it is
reasonable to think that it should not decrease the seller’s expected revenues. Our next result shows that, in
our environment, disclosing information to the agents does not affect the ex-ante expected revenue of the
designer. The difference in results stems from the imposed restriction on the selling mechanisms in Yin et
al [2009]. They analyzed a class of mechanisms in which the seller pre-announces two prices: premium and
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post-seasonal prices. In particular, more sophisticated pricing policies that depend on the available stock,
or on some additional information such as previous arrivals, are a-priori excluded. Our next result formally
proves a revenue equivalence property that holds independently of the information revealed to the agents:
Theorem 15 (Generalized Revenue Equivalence) Suppose that arrivals are unobservable to the princi-
pal, and that each agent i observes at the time of his arrival ai a signal si that is (weakly) less informative
than observing the prior history of arrivals and reported values {(aj)j≤N (ai), (vj)j≤N (ai),j 6=i}. Then, it
is revenue maximizing for the principal to disclose all information to the agents, and to use the mechanism
described in Theorem 12.
The intuitive interpretation of Theorem 15 is that, as the signal si is observable to the principal, he
needs not to pay an information rent for it, and thus his revenue is not distorted by it. More interestingly,
Theorem 15 also shows that, in the case of observable arrivals, the principal cannot increase revenue by
hiding any information from agents. If some information is concealed from an agent, then the agent and
the principal have different beliefs about the future arrivals, and hence different probability measures in
calculating the discounted time of getting an object. However, after seeing his signal, the agent has correct
updated beliefs about the arrivals. The principal only cares about revenue from an ex-ante perspective,
which are completely determined by the agents’ ex-ante expected allocation. More precisely, given a fixed
allocation of the objects, the seller’s expected revenue is given by the total social value generated from the
allocation less the agents’ expected utilities. Using the law of iterated expectations, the agent’s ex-ante
expected utility from participating in a mechanism where a more precise signal si is revealed equals the
agent’s ex-ante expected utility from participating in the mechanism where no information is revealed and
where the agent can condition his strategy on arrival time and value only.
5.4 The Effect of Strategic Agents on Revenue
As mentioned in the introduction, a major issue in the recent literature on applied revenue management has
been to quantify the cost of strategic arrivals. This literature compares two scenarios: In the first, buyers
arrive and decide whether to buy or not, and then leave the mechanism immediately. In the second, buyers
strategically time their purchase. The following proposition shows that, at the optimum, the obtained revenue
is always higher when customers strategically time their purchase! This holds because the seller is able to
better intertemporally price-discriminate by “keeping in store” customers that may myopically not buy at a
time where prices are too high, and then disappear. This benefit accrues here despite the fact that learning
about demand may be potentially disrupted by consumers’ strategic behavior. We assume below that the
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seller is either in a scenario with short-lived consumers or in a scenario with long-lived customers that can
time their buying decision, and that he knows which scenario is the relevant one.
Corollary 16 (Strategic) The revenue in the optimal mechanism for short-lived agents (that only buy upon
arrival) is lower than the revenue in the optimal mechanism for agents who can strategically time their
buying decision, and whose arrivals are unobservable.
Board and Skrypacz [2015] reached the same conclusion using deterministic posted price mechanisms
in a simpler model where arrivals follow a known Poisson process. In our model the same result holds true
despite the effect of later arrivals on the designer’s beliefs, continuation value and pricing scheme.
It is important to note that the Markov assumption about the arrival process is crucial for the above
conclusion. The optimal policy with observable arrivals in the example of Section 4.4 only allocates objects
upon arrival. Hence it follows that it is also implementable if agents are short-lived, and therefore the
revenue there is strictly lower if agents can strategically time their purchase !
6 Conclusion
We have conducted the first, full mechanism design analysis of the the revenue maximizing mechanism in
a model where the unobservable arrivals are governed by a Markov counting process, and where agents are
privately informed both about values and arrival times. Since arrivals may be correlated, the seller learns
along the way about future arrivals, while agents strategically time their purchases.
Because of the effect of learning while earning, the revenue maximizing mechanism does not generally
reduces to posted prices, and needs to charge personalized prices. But it is possible to implement it in an
indirect mechanism that resembles the well-known Name-Your-Own-Price mechanism: each agent submits
a bid upon arrival, and, at each point in time, the seller decides which of the submitted bids, if any, to
satisfy. In our framework, the optimal strategy in a NYOP mechanism imposes a relatively high computa-
tional burden on the buyers. Thus, we also presented a two-phases ”learn and then sell” mechanism that is
asymptotically optimal. In this mechanism the seller first charges a relatively low price that allows him to
learn about the arrival process. In a second stage, the seller charges the optimal fixed posted price given the
information obtained in the first stage.
An important insight from our analysis is that the presence of long-lived, strategic agents yields here a
higher revenue than the one that can be optimally obtained in the situation where agents must buy immedi-
ately upon arrival. In other words, we show that appropriate revenue management techniques can be used to
overcome and even draw benefits from the presence of strategic consumers.
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Finally, our analysis also answers the question whether the seller can increase revenue by withholding
information from potential buyers: if the seller uses the optimal mechanism (which, recall does not generally
reduces to posted prices), hiding information is never beneficial.
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